Abstract. Mean field games are studied by means of the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control. This approach allows the mean field interactions to enter through both state and control processes and take a form which is general enough to include rank and nearest-neighbor effects. Moreover, the data may depend discontinuously on the state variable, and more generally its entire history. Existence and uniqueness results are proven, along with a procedure for identifying and constructing distributed strategies which provide approximate Nash equlibria for finite-player games. Our results are applied to a new class of multi-agent price impact models and a class of flocking models for which we prove existence of equilibria.
Introduction
The methodology of mean field games initiated by Lasry and Lions [32] has provided an elegant and tractable way to study approximate Nash equilibria for large-population stochastic differential games with a so-called mean field interaction. In such games, the players' private state processes are coupled only through their empirical distribution. Borrowing intuition from statistical physics, Lasry and Lions study the system which should arise in the limit as the number of players tends to infinity. A set of strategies for the finite-player game is then derived from the solution of this limiting problem. These strategies form an approximate Nash equilibrium for the n-player game if n is large, in the sense that no player can improve his expected reward by more than ǫ n by unilaterally changing his strategy, where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞ (see [25] ). An attractive feature of these strategies is that they are distributed, in the sense that the strategy of a single player depends only on his own private state.
Mean field games have seen a wide variety of applications, including models of oil production, volatility formation, population dynamics, and economic growth (see [32, 22, 33, 31] for some examples). Independently, Huang, Malhamé, and Caines developed a similar research program under the name of Nash Certainty Equivalent. The interested reader is referred to [25] and [26] and the papers cited therein. They have since generalized the framework, allowing for several different types of players and one major player.
The finite-player games studied in this paper are summarized as follows. For i = 1, . . . , n, the dynamics of player i's private state process are given by a stochastic differential equation (SDE):
where µ n is the empirical distribution of the states:
2)
The drift b may depend on time, player i's private state (possibly its history), the distribution of the private states (possibly their histories), and player i's own choice of control α i t . Here, W i are independent Wiener processes and ξ i are independent identically distributed random variables independent of the Wiener processes, and each player has the same drift and volatility coefficients. Moreover, each player i has the same objective, which is to maximize over all admissible choices of α i , subject to the constraint (1.1). Note that the running reward function f may depend upon the empirical distribution of the controls at time t, in addition to the same arguments as b. This is part of the thrust of the paper. Of course, each player's objective depends on the actions of the other players, and so we look for Nash equilibria.
Intuitively, if n is large, because of the symmetry of the model, player i's contribution to µ n is negligible, and he may as well treat µ n as fixed. This line of argument leads to the derivation of the mean field game problem, which has the following structure:
(1) Fix a probability measure µ on path space and a flow ν : t → ν t of measures on the control space; (2) With µ and ν frozen, solve the standard optimal control problem:
sup α E T 0 f (t, X, µ, ν t , α t )dt + g(X, µ) , s.t. dX t = b(t, X, µ, α t )dt + σ(t, X)dW t , X 0 = ξ; (1.3) (3) Find an optimal control α, inject it into the dynamics of (1.3), and find the law Φ x (µ, ν) of the optimally controlled state process, and the flow Φ α (µ, ν) of marginal laws of the optimal control process; (4) Find a fixed point µ = Φ x (µ, ν), ν = Φ α (µ, ν). This is to be interpreted as the optimization problem faced by a single representative player in a game consisting of infinitely many independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) players. In the first three steps, the representative player determines his best response to the other players' states and controls which he treats as given. The final step is an equilibrium condition; if each player takes this approach, and there is to be any consistency, then there should be a fixed point. Once existence and perhaps uniqueness of a fixed point are established, the second problem is to use this fixed point to construct approximate Nash equilibrium strategies for the original finite-player game. These strategies will be constructed from the optimal control for the problem of step (2) , corresponding to the choosing (µ, ν) to be the fixed point in step (1) .
The literature on mean field games comprises two streams of papers: one based on analytic methods and one on a probabilistic approach.
Lasry and Lions (e.g. [32] , [22] , etc.) study these problems via a system of partial differential equations (PDEs). The control problem gives rise to a Hamilton-JacobiBellman equation for the value function, which evolves backward in time. The law of the state process is described by a Kolmogorov equation, which evolves forward in time. These equations are coupled through the dependence on the law of the state process, in light of the consistency requirement (4) . This approach applies in the Markovian case, when the data b, σ, f , and g are smooth or at least continuous functions of the states and not of their pasts. Results in this direction include two broad classes of mean field interactions: some have considered local dependence of the data on the measure argument, such as functions (x, µ) → G(dµ(x)/dx) of the density, while others have studied nonlocal functionals, which are continuous with respect to a weak or Wasserstein topology.
More recently, several authors have taken a probabilistic approach to this problem by using the Pontryagin maximum principle to solve the optimal control problem. See, for example, [10, 6, 11] . Typically in a stochastic optimal control problem, the backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) satisfied by the adjoint processes are coupled with the forward SDE for the state process through the optimal control, which is generally a function of both the forward and backward parts. When the maximum principle is applied to mean field games, the forward and backward equations are coupled additionally through the law of the forward part. Carmona and Delarue investigate this new type of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) in [9] . It should be noted that there is a similar but distinct way to analyze the infinite-player limit of large-population games, leading to the optimal control of stochastic dynamics of McKean-Vlasov type. Early forms of a stochastic maximum principle for this new type of control problem were given in [4, 7, 34] . A general form of this principle was given in [10] where it was applied to the solution of the control problem. A comparison of these two asymptotic regimes is given in [12] .
The aim of this paper is to present a new probabilistic approach to the analysis of mean field games with uncontrolled diffusion coefficients. Assuming σ = σ(t, x) contains neither a mean field term nor a control, we obtain a general existence result. Under stronger assumptions, we prove a modest extension of the uniqueness result of Lasry and Lions [32] . Finally, we provide a construction of approximate Nash equilibria for finite-player games in the spirit of [11] , in the case that b has no mean field term.
Our analysis is based on the weak formulation of stochastic optimal control problems, sometimes known as the martingale approach; see for example, [15, 30, 37] . This approach depends heavily on the non-degeneracy of σ and its independence of the control, and in our case, it is also important that σ has no mean field term. The strong formulation of the problem, as in [11] , would require that the state SDEs have strong solutions when controls are applied. The two formulations are compared in Remark 7.12. One of the main conveniences of the weak formulation is that weak existence and uniqueness of the state SDE require much less regularity in the coefficients, which are allowed to be path-dependent and merely measurable in the state variable. Also, the value function solves a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE), and necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimality of a control follow easily from the comparison principle for BSDEs. This method is discussed by El Karoui and Quenez in [30] , Peng in [37] , and perhaps most thoroughly by Hamadene and Lepeltier in [23] .
Our results allow for the mean field interaction (at least in the running reward function f ) to occur through the control processes in addition to the state processes. This seems quite important for many practical applications and has received very little attention thusfar in the literature of mean field games. A very recent paper of Gomes and Voskanyan [21] uses PDE methods to study these types of interactions in the deterministic case, σ ≡ 0, under the name extended mean field games. Under strong continuity and convexity assumptions, they obtain existence as well as some regularity of the solutions, and interestingly they are able to allow for general dependence of the running objective f on the joint law of the state and control processes. Our setting is very different: notably σ > 0, and our convexity and continuity assumptions are much weaker.
We also allow for very general nonlocal mean field interactions, including but not limited to weakly or Wasserstein continuous functionals. Among the natural interactions that have not yet been addressed in the mean field games literature which we are able to treat, we mention the case of coefficients which depend on the rank (Example 5.9 in Section 5), or on the mean field of the individual's nearest neighbors (Section 2.2). Our framework also includes models with different types of agents, similar to [25] . Moreover, f does not need to be strictly convex, and may in fact be identically zero. A final novelty of our results worth emphasizing is that they apply in non-Markovian settings and require no continuity in the state variable.
For the sake of illustration, we present two applications which had been touted as models for mean field games, without being solved in full generality. First we study price impact models in which asset price dynamics depend naturally on the rates of change of investors' positions, inspired by the model of Carlin et al. [8] . As a second application of our theoretical results, we discuss a model of flocking proposed by Nourian et al. in [35] to provide a mechanism by which flocking behavior emerges as an equilibrium, as a game counterpart of the well-known Cucker-Smale model, [14] . In [35] , the authors identify the mean field limit and, under the assumption that there exists a unique solution to the limiting mean field game, construct approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player games. While flocking is often defined mathematically as a large time phenomenon (case in point, the stationary form of the mean field game strategy is considered in [35] ), we treat the finite horizon case to be consistent with the set-up of the paper, even though this case is most often technically more challenging. We provide existence and approximation results for both their model and two related nearest-neighbor models.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce the two practical applications in Section 2. The price impact models of Section 2.1 motivate the analysis of mean field games in which players interact through their controls, while Section 2.2 describes the flocking model of [35] as well as two related nearest-neighbor models. Then, Section 3 provides precise statements of the assumptions used throughout the paper and the main existence and uniqueness results. Section 4 explains the construction of approximate Nash equilibria for the finite-player game. The assumptions of the main theorems are discussed in more detail in Section 5, along with important examples. In Section 6 the general theory is specialized to the applications of Section 2. The proofs of the main theorems of Sections 3 and 4 are given in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
2. Applications 2.1. Price impact models. To motivate our generalization of the class of mean field games worthy of investigation, we present a simple multi-agent model of price impact which leads to mean field interaction through the control processes. The model is along the lines of Almgren and Chriss's model [3] for price impact, or rather its natural extension to an n-player competitive game given by Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan in [8] . The latter model is highly tractable, modeling a flat order book from which each agent must execute a fixed order. We instead model a nonlinear order book and use fairly general reward functions. See [1, 20] for a discussion of order book mechanics as well as a discussion of resilience, a concept we do not address. In our model, after each trade, the order book reconstructs itself instantly around a new mid-price S t , and with the same shape. At each time t, each agent faces a cost structure given by the same transaction cost curve c : R → [0, ∞], which is convex and satisfies c(0) = 0. We consider only order books with finite volume; an infinite value for c(α) simply means that the volume α is not available. Flat order books are common in the literature, though not realistic: they correspond to quadratic transaction costs c.
We work on a filtered probability space (Ω, 
Assuming c is differentiable on its domain, the marginal price per share of this trade is S t + c ′ (α i t ), meaning that the agent receives all of the volume on the order book between the prices S t and S t + c ′ (α i t ). The order book should recenter somewhere in this price range, say at S t + γc ′ (α i t )/n, where γ > 0. The factor of 1/n is irrelevant when n is fixed, but it is the right scaling factor for obtaining a mean field approximation.
In a continuous-time, continuous-trading model with multiple agents, it is not clear how simultaneous trades should be handled. Somewhat more realistic are continuous-time, discrete-trade models, which many continuous-trade models are designed to approximate. In a continuous-time, discrete-trade model, it is reasonable to assume that agents never trade simultaneously, given that there is a continuum of trade times to choose from. We choose to model this in our continuous-trade setting in the following manner: When the n agents trade at rates α 1 t , . . . , α n t at time t, agent i still pays α i t S t + c(α i t ), but the total change in price is γ n
Finally, the mid-price is modeled as an underlying martingale plus a drift representing a form of permanent price impact:
3.1. Construction of the mean field game. Let B(E, τ ) denote the Borel σ-field of a topological space (E, τ ). When the choice of topology is clear, we use the abbreviated form B(E). For a measurable space (Ω, F ), let P(Ω) denote the set of probability measures on (Ω, F ). We write µ ≪ µ ′ when µ is absolutely continuous with respect to µ ′ , and µ ∼ µ ′ when the measures are equivalent. Given a measurable function ψ : Ω → [1, ∞), we set:
We define τ ψ (Ω) to be the weakest topology on P ψ (Ω) making the map µ → f dµ continuous for each f ∈ B ψ (Ω). The space (P ψ (Ω), τ ψ (Ω)) is generally neither metrizable nor separable, which will pose some problems. We define the empirical measure map e n : Ω n → P(Ω) by
Notice that e n need not be B(P ψ (Ω), τ ψ (Ω))-measurable, but this will not be an issue.
Definition 3.1. Given measurable spaces E and F , we say that a function f :
is jointly measurable for all n ≥ 1. throughout. It will play a role similar to the "Lyapunov-like" function of Gärtner [19] , controlling a tradeoff between integrability and continuity requirements. Some comments on the choice of ψ follow in Remark 3.7. For any µ ∈ P(C) and t ∈ [0, T ], the marginal µ t denotes the image of µ under the coordinate map C ∋ x → x t ∈ R d . We use the notation λ 0 ∈ P(R d ) for the initial distribution of the infinitely many players' state processes. Let Ω := R d ×C, define ξ(x, ω) := x and W (x, ω) := ω, and let P denote the product of λ 0 and the Wiener measure, defined on B(Ω). Define F t to be the completion of σ((ξ, W s ) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t) by P -null sets of B(Ω), and set F := (F t ) 0≤t≤T . We work with the filtered probability space (Ω, F T , F, P ) for the remainder of the section. For k ∈ N and q ≥ 1 define the space H q,k to be the set of progressively measurable h :
For a martingale M , we denote by E(M ) its Doleans stochastic exponential. We now state assumptions on the data which will stand throughout the paper. Unless otherwise stated, P ψ (C) is equipped with the topology τ ψ (C).
The following assumptions (S) are implicitly assumed throughout the paper. 
is progressively measurable for each (µ, a), and a → b(t, x, µ, a) is continuous for each (t, x, µ). (S.2) There exists a unique strong solution X of the driftless state equation
We will elaborate on these and the subsequent assumptions in Section 6 below, but for now let us make a few remarks. If σ has linear growth, ψ(x) = 1 + x p , and
Compactness of A is a strong assumption which will be used in several places, in particular to ensure that P(A) is compact. Boundedness of σ −1 b is also restrictive, but it will be crucial to ensure that the Hamiltonian is a uniformly Lipschitz function of the adjoint variable. See Remark 5.8 for more details and some comments about relaxing these assumption.
From now on, X denotes the unique solution of (3.1). For each µ ∈ P ψ (C) and
By Girsanov's theorem and boundedness of σ −1 b, the process W µ,α defined by
is a Wiener process under P µ,α , and
That is, under P µ,α , X is a weak solution of the state equation. Note that P µ,α and P agree on F 0 ; in particular, the law of X 0 = ξ is still λ 0 . Moreover, ξ and W remain independent under P µ,α .
Remark 3.2.
It is well-known that the nonsingularity assumption (S.2) of σ guarantees that F coincides with the completion of the filtration generated by X. It is thus implicit in the definition of A that our admissible controls can be written in closed-loop form, that is as deterministic functions of (t, X).
We now state the assumptions on the reward functions entering the objectives to be maximized by the players. Throughout, P(A) is endowed with the weak topology and its corresponding Borel σ-field.
is progressively measurable for each (µ, q, a) and a → f (t, x, µ, q, a) is continuous for each (t, x, µ, q). The terminal reward function g :
(S.4) There exist c > 0 and an increasing function ρ :
Since ψ ≥ 1, this is equivalent to the same assumption but with ψ replaced by 1 + ψ. (S.5) The function f is of the form Given a measure µ ∈ P ψ (C), a control α ∈ A, and a measurable map [0, T ] ∋ t → q t ∈ P(A), we define the associated expected reward by
where E µ,α denotes expectation with respect to the measure P µ,α . Considering µ and q as fixed, we are faced with a standard stochastic optimal control problem, the value of which is given by
Definition 3.4. We say a measure µ ∈ P ψ (C) and a measurable function q : 
and the set on which the supremum is attained by
respectively. Note that A(t, x, µ, q, z) does not depend on q, in light of assumption (S.5), so we shall often drop q from the list of arguments of A and use the notation A(t, x, µ, z). Note also that A(t, x, µ, z) is always nonempty, since A is compact and h is continuous in a by assumptions (S.1) and (S.3).
Assumption (C).
For each (t, x, µ, z), the set A(t, x, µ, z) is convex.
It will be useful to have notation for the driftless law and the set of equivalent laws:
Assumption (E) (Existence assumptions). For each (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×C the following maps are sequentially continuous, using τ ψ (C) on P X and the weak topology on P(A):
Theorem 3.5. Suppose (E) and (C) hold. Then there exists a solution of the MFG.
Remark 3.6. It is worth emphasizing that sequential continuity is often easier to check for τ ψ (C), owing in part to the failure of the dominated convergence theorem for nets. For example, functions like
for bounded measurable φ are always sequentially continuous but may fail to be continuous.
Remark 3.7. The function ψ enters the assumptions in two essential ways. On the one hand, the functions b, f , and g should be τ ψ (C)-continuous in their measure arguments as in (E). On the other hand, the solution of the SDE dX t = σ(t, X)dW t should possess ψ 2 -moments as in (S.2), and the growth of f and g should be controlled by ψ, as in (S.4). There is a tradeoff in the choice of ψ: larger ψ makes the latter point more constraining and the former less constraining.
The following uniqueness theorem is inspired by Lasry and Lions [32] . They provide counterexamples to show that one should not expect uniqueness in much generality, unless one assumes that the time horizon is small and the coefficients are suitably Lipschitz (e.g. [25] ). Remark 3.10. The following simple extension of the above formulation allows more heterogeneity among agents. Work instead on a probability space
where Ω ′ is some measurable space which will model additional time-zero randomness. We may then fix an initial law λ 0 ∈ P(Ω ′ × R d ), and let P be the product of λ 0 and Wiener measure. Letting (θ, ξ, W ) denote the coordinate maps, we work with the filtration generated by the process (θ, ξ, W s ) 0≤s≤T . The data b, σ, f , and g may all depend on θ. In the finite-player game, the agents have can encode other differences between the agents. For example, in a price impact model, perhaps a fraction ρ ∈ [0, 1] of the agents need to liquidate but the rest do not; this can be modeled using such a θ which equals c > 0 with probability ρ and 0 otherwise, and setting g(X, θ) = θ|X T | 2 for some c > 0. This generalization complicates the notation but changes essentially none of the analysis.
Approximate Nash equilibria for finite-player games
Before proving these theorems, we discuss how a solution of the MFG may be used to construct an approximate Nash equilibrium for the finite-player game, using only distributed controls. Additional assumptions are needed for the approximation results:
t , q, a), where µ t denotes the image of µ under the map C ∋ x → x ·∧t ∈ C; (F.3) The functions b, f , and g are empirically measurable, as in Definition 3.1, using the progressive σ-field on [0, T ] × C, and Borel σ-fields elsewhere; (F.4) For each (t, x), the following functions are continuous at each point satisfying µ ∼ X :
(F.5) There exists c > 0 such that, for all (t, x, µ, q, a),
Remark 4.1. The continuity assumption (F.4) is stronger than assumption (E). Indeed, in (E) we required only sequential continuity on a subset of the space P ψ (C). Assumption (F.2) is simply progressive measurability of f with respect to the measure argument, which in fact was not needed for the results of Section 3. Analogs of the result of this section are possible when (F.1) fails, under stronger continuity requirements. Namely, σ −1 b, f , and g should be continuous in µ uniformly in the other arguments, and σ −1 b should be uniformly Lipschitz in µ with respect to total variation. However, we refrain from elaborating on this result, as it seems suboptimal and the proof is quite long.
Adhering to the philosophy of the weak formulation, we choose a single convenient probability space on which we define the n-player games, simultaneously for all n. Assumptions (C) and (F) stand throughout this section (as does (S), as always). We fix a solution of the MFG (μ,q) throughout, whose existence is guaranteed by Theorem 3.5, with corresponding closed-loop controlα(t, x) (see Remark 3.2). Consider a probability space (Ω, F , P ) supporting a sequence (
. .) with common law λ 0 , and processes (X 1 , X 2 , . . .) satisfying ] denote the completion of the filtration generated by (X 1 , . . . , X n ) by null sets of F . Let X i denote the completion of the filtration generated by X i . Note that X i are independent and identically distributed and that the process (ξ i , W i t ) 0≤t≤T generates the same filtration X i , as in Remark 3.2. Abbreviate α i t =α(t, X i ). These controls are known as distributed controls. We now describe the n-player game for fixed n. The control space A n is the set of all F n -progressively measurable A-valued processes; the players have complete information of the other players' state processes. On the other hand, A n n is the nfold Cartesian product of A n , or the set of F n -progressively measurable A n -valued processes. Let µ n denote the empirical measure of the first n state processes as defined in the introduction by (1.2). For
Under P n (β), for each i = 1, . . . , n, X i is a weak solution of the SDE
with common law λ 0 under any of the measures P n (β) with β ∈ A n n . For β = (β 1 , . . . , β n ) ∈ A n n , the value to player i of the strategies β is defined by
where, for a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A n , we define
Note that the joint measurability assumption (F.3) guarantees that g( 
Remark 4.3. The punchline is that α i is X i -adapted for each i. That is, player i determines his strategy based only on his own state process. As explained earlier, such strategies are said to be distributed. The theorem tells us that even with full information, there is an approximate Nash equilibrium consisting of distributed controls, and we know precisely how to construct one using a solution of the MFG. Note that the strategies (α i ) i∈N also form an approximate Nash equilibrium for any partial-information version of the game, as long as player i has access to (at least) the filtration X i generated by his own state process.
Discussion of the assumptions and examples
This section discusses some important special cases of the assumptions of Sections 3 and 4. Assumptions (C) and (U) are examined first, before we turn to assumptions (S), (E), and (F).
5.1. Assumptions (C) and (U). Condition (C) (resp. (U.1)) is crucial for the fixed point (resp. uniqueness) argument and holds when the Hamiltonian h(t, x, µ, q, z, a) is concave (resp. strictly concave) in a, for each (t, x, µ, q, z), which is a common assumption in control theory. For example, condition (C) (resp. (U.1)) holds if b is affine in a and f is concave (resp. strictly concave) in a. More generally, we can get away with quasiconcavity in the previous statements. Note that if f ≡ 0 then A(t, x, µ, 0) = A, and thus condition (U.1) fails except in trivial cases. However, condition (C) frequently holds even in the absence of a running reward function f ≡ 0; the optimal control in such a case is typically a bang-bang control. 
• g(x, µ) = φ 1 (x) + φ 2 (µ) for some φ 1 : C → R and φ 2 : P ψ (C) → R. In this case, there is equality for all µ, µ ′ .
2 for some φ : C → R. If, for example, φ(x) = x, then this payoff function rewards a player if his state process deviates from the average. 
Assumptions (S), (E), and (F). Standard arguments give:
p|x| for some p > 0, and let The measurability requirement (F.3) is unusual, but not terribly restrictive. The more difficult assumption to verify is that of continuity, (F.4). Common assumptions in the literature involve continuity with respect to the topology of weak convergence or more generally a Wasserstein metric. For a separable Banach space (E, · E ) and p ≥ 1, let
where the infimum is over all π ∈ P(E × E) with marginals µ and µ ′ . When ψ E,p (x) = 1+ x p E , it is known that W E,p metrizes the weakest topology making the map P ψE,p (E) ∋ µ → φ dµ continuous for each continuous function φ ∈ B ψE,p (E) (see Theorem 7.12 of [41] ). Thus W E,p is weaker than τ ψE,p (C), which proves the following result. Lemma 5.3. Let ψ = ψ C,p , p ≥ 1. Suppose f and g are (sequentially) continuous in (µ, q, a) at points with µ ∼ X , for each (t, x), using the metric W C,p on P ψ (C).
Then (F.4) holds.
In most applications the coefficients are Markovian; that is, f (t, x, µ, q, a) =f (t, x t , µ t , q, a) , for somef .
Note that for any µ, µ ′ ∈ P(C), p ≥ 1, and t ∈ [0, T ],
and thus the previous proposition includes Markovian data. Note also that assumption (F.4) demands continuity in the measure argument only at the points which are equivalent to X . Of course, if σ does not depend on X or is uniformly bounded from below, then X t ∼ L for all t > 0, and thus in the Markovian case we need only to check thatf is continuous at points which are equivalent to Lebesgue measure. At no point was a Markov property of any use, and this is why we chose to allow path-dependence in each of the coefficients. Moreover, continuity in the spatial variable was never necessary either. Indeed, we require only that dX t = σ(t, X)dW t admits a strong solution, as in assumption (S.2), which of course covers the usual Lipschitz assumption. The most common type of mean field interaction is scalar and Markovian, so we investigate such cases carefully.
Proposition 5.4 (Scalar dependence on the measure). Consider a function of the form
where 
satisfies the relevant parts of assumptions (S.3), (S.4), (E), (F).
Proof. Note that ψ : C → [1, ∞) is lower-semicontinuous and thus measurable. Note also that the function C ∋ y → F (t, x, y t , q, a) ∈ R is in B ψ (C) for each (t, x, q, a) ∈ [0, T ] × R d × P(A) × A, and thus f is indeed well defined for µ ∈ P ψ (C). Property (F.2) is obvious, and property (F.5) follows from the inequality
The measurability assumption (F.3) is easy to verify. Condition (E) will follow from (F.4), which we prove now.
Fix (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × C, and let
We also have µ
The second term clearly tends to zero. For the first term, fix ǫ > 0. Since E is compact metric, the function R d ∋ y → F 0 (y, ·) ∈ C(E) is measurable, using the Borel σ-field generated by the supremum norm on the space C(E) of continuous real-valued functions of E; see Theorem 4.55 of [2] . Thus, by Lusin's theorem (12.8 of [2] ), there exists a compact set
It follows from the compactness of E and Lemma 5.6 below that the restriction of F 0 to K × E is uniformly continuous. Since K is compact, we use Lemma 5.6 again in the other direction to get sup y∈K |F 0 (y,
we have lim sup
Corollary 5.5. Let F and ψ 0 be as in Proposition 5.4 , and suppose
where
is jointly measurable and continuous in its last three arguments. If also
|G(t, x, y, q, a)| ≤ c (ψ 0 (x) + |y|)
for some c > 0, then f satisfies the relevant parts of assumptions (S.3), (S.4), (E), (F).
We will occasionally need the following simple lemma, which was used in the proof of Proposition 5.4. Its proof is straightforward and thus omitted. t, x, µ, a) =b(t, µ, a) x t , σ(t, x) =σ(t)x t , whereσ(t) > 0 for all t andσ −1b is bounded.
Remark 5.8. We close the subsection with a remark on the assumption of boundedness of σ −1 b, which could certainly be relaxed. The reason for this assumption lies in the BSDE (7.1) for the value function; boundedness of σ −1 b equates to a standard Lipschitz driver, as covered in [36] . The results of Hamadene and Lepeltier in [23] may be applied if b and σ have linear growth in x and σ is bounded below, but this increases the technicalities and rules out a direct application of the results of [24] . However, we only really need [24] in order to treat mean field interactions in the control, and thus our analysis should still work under appropriate linear growth assumptions. Our assumptions of boundedness of σ −1 b and compactness of A unfortunately rule out common linear-quadratic models, but, nonetheless, the same general techniques could be used to study a large class of linear-quadratic problems (still, of course, with uncontrolled volatility) in which both these assumptions fail. More care is required in the choice of admissible controls, and the BSDE for the value function becomes quadratic in z; this program was carried out for stochastic optimal control problems in [18] , and could presumably be adapted to mean field games.
5.3. Additional Examples. Corollary 5.5 allows us to treat many mean field interactions which are not weakly continuous, as they may involve integrals of discontinuous functions. This is useful in the following examples.
Example 5.9 (Rank effects). Suppose an agent's reward depends on the rank of his state process among the population. That is, suppose d = 1 and f (t, x, µ, q, a) involves a term of the form G(µ t (−∞, x t ]), where G : [0, 1] → R is continuous. Such terms with G monotone are particularly interesting for applications, as suggested for a model of oil production in [22] . The intuition is that an oil producer prefers to produce before his competitors, in light of the uncertainty about the longevity of the oil supply. The state process X represents oil reserves, and G should be decreasing in their model. Proposition 5.4 shows that the inclusion of such terms as µ t (−∞, x t ] in f or g is compatible with all of our assumptions. If b contains such rank effects, no problem is posed for assumptions (S) and (E), but of course (F.1) is violated.
Example 5.10 (Types). In [25] , Huang, Caines, and Malhamé consider multiple types of agents, and a dependence on the mean field within each type. The number of types is fixed, and an agent cannot change type during the course of the game. Using the construction of Remark 3.10, we may model this by giving each agent a random but i.i.d. type at time zero. Alternatively, in some models an agent's type may change with his state (or with time, or with his strategy); for example, a person's income bracket depends on his wealth. Suppose, for example, that A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A m ⊂ R d are Borel sets of positive Lebesgue measure, and define F i :
and F i (µ) = 0 otherwise. As long as σ is bounded away from zero, then X t ∼ L where L is again Lebesgue measure on R d , and indeed F i are τ 1 (R d )-continuous at points µ ∼ X t . So we can treat functionals of the form f (t, x, µ, q, a) = G(t, x t , F (µ t ), q, a), where F = (F 1 , . . . , F m ) , and
Applications revisited
Before proving the main results, we return briefly to the models presented in Section 2, for which we demonstrate the applicability of the existence and approximation theorems (3.5 and 4.2). 6.1. Price impact models. We restrict our attention to finite-volume order books. We suppose that A ⊂ R is a compact interval containing the origin, c ′ : A → R is continuous and nondecreasing, σ > 0, f : [0, T ] × R → R and g : R → R are measurable, and finally that there exists c 1 > 0 such that
Let c(x) = 
, and ψ(x) = e c1 x . It is quite easy to check the assumptions of the previous sections, at least with the help of Lemma 5.2 below, yielding the following theorem. Moreover, in this simple case we can estimate the rate of convergence, as proven at the end of Section 8. 
Flocking models.
To work around the degeneracy of the diffusion (X i , V i ), we consider only V i as the state variable, and recover X i by making the coefficients path-dependent. Let b(t, v, µ, a) = a, σ > 0 constant, g ≡ 0, and
Note that ι(t, V i ) represents the position of the individual at time t; we are assuming each individual starts at the origin to keep the notation simple and consistent, although any initial distribution of positions could be accounted for by using the construction of Remark 3.10. For flocking models, (2.2) is captured by choosing a running reward function of the form:
The minus signs are only to turn the problem into a maximization, to be consistent with the notation of the rest of the paper. Recall that φ : [0, ∞) → [0, ∞) is nonincreasing and thus Borel measurable. Assume the initial data V i are i.i.d. and square-integrable, with law λ 0 ∈ P 2 (R d ). Take ψ(x) = 1 + x 2 for x ∈ C. For the nearest neighbor model, we use
where r > 0 was given, and B(x, r ′ ) denotes the closed ball of radius r ′ centered at x. Consider the second term above to be zero whenever I(t, µ)(B(ι(t, v), r)) = 0. Finally, for the k-nearest-neighbor model, we choose η ∈ (0, 1) to represent a fixed percentage of neighbors, which amounts to keeping k/n fixed in the finite-player game as we send n → ∞. We define r :
and
It is straightforward to check that the objective (2.4) for the nearest neighbor models is equivalent to maximizing
replacing f (1) by f (2) in the case of the k-nearest neighbor model.
Proposition 6.2. Under the above assumptions, the existence and approximation theorems 3.5 and 4.2 apply to each of the flocking models.
Proof. Assumptions (S.1), (S.4), (S.5), (C), (F.1), (F.2), and (F.5) are easy to check. Lemma 5.2 below takes care of (S.2). Also, (S.3) and (F.3) are clear for f (1) and f (2) , and follow from Lemma 6.3 below for f (3) . It remains to check the continuity assumption (F.4). For f (1) , this follows from Proposition 5.4 below. Apply Itô's formula to tW t to get
Since ξ and W are independent, we see that I(t, X ) ∼ L for t ∈ (0, T ], where L denotes Lebesgue measure on R d . Hence I(t, µ) ∼ L for µ ∼ X , and so µ → 1/I(t, µ)(B(x, r)) is τ ψ (C)-continuous at points µ ∼ X , for each (x, r) ∈ R d ×(0, ∞). This along with Proposition 5.4 below establish (F.4) for f (2) . Finally, we prove (F.4) for f (3) . Fix (t, v) ∈ (0, T ] × C, and define
for µ ∈ P ψ (C). In light of Lemma 5.3 and the discussion preceding it, it suffices to show F is W C,2 -continuous at points µ ∼ X . Let µ n → µ in W C,2 with µ ∼ X , and
Note that I(t, µ n ) → I(t, µ) weakly, and thus
by Lemma 6.3. Since 1 B µ n → 1 Bµ holds L-a.e. (and thus I(t, µ)-a.e.) and C (v
→ 0, the dominated convergence theorem yields I n → 0. To show II n → 0, note that note that
Since the latter measure is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, Theorem 4.2 of [38] implies
In fact, we should consider separately the positive and negative parts of each of the d components of the signed vector measures (v Proof. To prove measurability, note that for any c > 0 {(z, x, y) : r(e n (z), x, y) > c} = (z, x, y) :
Since µ ∼ L, the map r → µ(B(x, r)) is continuous and strictly increasing. Thus the inverse function r(µ, x, ·) is also continuous, and we may find δ > 0 such that |r(µ, x, y) − r(µ, x, z)| < ǫ whenever |z − y| ≤ δ. Theorem 4.2 of [38] tells us that µ n (B) → µ(B) uniformly over measurable convex sets B, since µ ≪ L. Hence, for n sufficiently large,
Thus, for sufficiently large n, r(µ n , x, y) = inf {r
and similarly r(µ n , x, y) ≤ inf {r ′ > 0 : µ(B(x, r ′ )) ≥ y + δ} = r(µ, x, y + δ) ≤ r(µ, x, y) + ǫ.
Proofs of existence and uniqueness theorems
This section is devoted to the proofs of the existence and uniqueness results of Theorems 3.5 and 3.8. Throughout the section, we work with the canonical probability space described in the second paragraph of Section 3. Since BSDEs will be used repeatedly, it is important to note that the classical existence, uniqueness, and comparison results for BSDEs do indeed hold in our setting, despite the fact that F is not the Brownian filtration. The purpose of working with the Brownian filtration is of course for martingale representation, which we still have with our slightly larger filtration: It follows from Theorem 4.33 of [28] , for example, that every square integrable F-martingale (M t ) 0≤t≤T admits the representation
. However, note that in our case the initial value of the solution of a BSDE is random, since F 0 is not trivial.
To find a fixed point for the law of the control, we will make use of the space M of positive Borel measures ν on [0, T ] × P(A) (using the weak topology on P(A)) whose first projection is Lebesgue measure; that is, ν([s, t] × P(A)) = t − s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . Endow M with the weakest topology making the map ν → φ dν continuous for each bounded measurable function φ : [0, T ] × P(A) → R for which φ(t, ·) is continuous for each t. This is known as the stable topology, which was studied thoroughly by Jacod and Mémin in [27] . In particular, since A is a compact metrizable space, so is P(A), and thus so is M. Note that a measure ν ∈ M disintegrates into ν(dt, dq) = ν t (dq)dt, where the measurable map [0, T ] ∋ t → ν t ∈ P(P(A)) is uniquely determined up to almost everywhere equality. For any bounded measurable function F : P(A) → R k , we extend F to P(P(A)) in the natural way by defining
In this way, F (δ q ) = F (q) for q ∈ P(A).
Remark 7.1. Because of condition (S.5), the aforementioned convention will not lead to any confusion regarding the meaning of H(t, x, µ, ν, z), for ν ∈ P(P(A)). In particular, it is consistent with the relationship H(t, x, µ, ν, a) := sup a∈A h(t, x, µ, ν, z, a), since the only dependence of h on ν is outside of the supremum.
For each (µ, ν) ∈ P ψ (C) × M, we now construct the corresponding control problem. The standing assumptions (S) are in force throughout, and the following construction is valid without any of the other assumptions. Recall the definitions of h and H from (3.2) in Section 3. That (t, x, z) → H(t, x, µ, ν t , z) is jointly measurable for each (µ, ν) follows, for example, from the measurable maximum Theorem 18.19 of [2] . Boundedness of σ −1 b guarantees that H is uniformly Lipschitz in z. Since µ ∈ P ψ (C), it follows from assumptions (S.2) and (S.4) that g(X, µ) ∈ L 2 (P ) and that (H(t, X, µ, ν t , 0)) 0≤t≤T = (sup a f (t, X, µ, ν t , a)) 0≤t≤T ∈ H 2,1 . Hence the classical result of Pardoux and Peng [36] (or rather a slight extension thereof, as remarked above) applies, and there exists a unique solution (
of the BSDE
For each α ∈ A, we may similarly solve the BSDE
Since W µ,α is a Wiener process under P µ,α and Y µ,α is adapted, we get
. It is immediate from the comparison principle for BSDEs (e.g. Theorem 2.2 of
. By a well-known measurable selection theorem (e.g. Theorem 18.19 of [2] ), there exists a functionα : 2) and such that for each µ the map (t, x, z) →α(t, x, µ, z) is jointly measurable with respect to the progressive σ-field 
, which in turn implies
The process α µ,ν is an optimal control, but so is any process in the set
The goal now is to find a point (µ, ν) ∈ P ψ (C)×M for which there exists α ∈ A(µ, ν) such that (µ, ν) = Φ(µ, α). In other words, we seek a fixed point of the set-valued map (µ, ν) → Φ(µ, A(µ, ν)) := {Φ(µ, α) : α ∈ A(µ, ν)}. Note that under condition (U.1), α µ,ν is the unique element of A(µ, ν) (up to almost everywhere equality), and this reduces to a fixed point problem for a single-valued function.
Remark 7.2. It is worth emphasizing that the preceding argument demonstrates that the set A(µ, ν) is always nonempty, under only the standing assumptions (S).
Remark 7.3. The main difficulty in the analysis is the adjoint process Z µ,ν . Note that for each (µ, ν) there exists a progressively measurable function ζ µ,ν :
. If we choose a measurable selectionα as in (7.2), any weak solution of the following McKean-Vlasov SDE provides a solution of the MFG:
The notation X ∼ µ means that µ should equal the law of X. This map ζ µ,ν is typically quite inaccessible, which is why we do not appeal to any existing results on McKean-Vlasov equations, even when ν is not present. All such results require some kind of continuity of the map
as far as the authors know. It is possible to make assumptions on the data which would guarantee, for example, that ζ µ,ν (t, ·) is continuous, but continuous dependence on µ would be a much trickier matter.
7.1. Some results of set-valued analysis. We precede the main proofs with some useful lemmas. Without assumption (U), the optimal controls need not be unique, and thus we will need a fixed point theorem for set-valued maps. We first summarize some terminology from set-valued analysis. For a point y in a metric space (E, d) and δ > 0, let B(y, δ) denote the open ball of radius δ centered at y. Similarly, for F ⊂ E, let B(F, δ) = {x ∈ E : inf y∈F d(x, y) < δ}. For two subsets F, G of E, we (abusively) define
Note that d is not symmetric. If K is another metric space, a set-valued function Γ : K → 2 E is said to be upper hemicontinuous at x ∈ K if for all ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that Γ(B(x, δ)) ⊂ B(Γ(x), ǫ). It is straightforward to prove that Γ is upper hemicontinuous at x ∈ K if and only if d(Γ(x), Γ(x n )) → 0 for every sequence x n converging to x.
In order to relax somewhat the convexity assumption of Kakutani's fixed point theorem, we adapt results of Cellina in [13] to derive a slight generalization of Kakutani's theorem, which will assist in the proof of Theorem 3.5. Proof. Let Gr(Γ) := {(x, y) ∈ K ×E : y ∈ Γ(x)} denote the graph of Γ. By Cellina's result (Theorem 1 of [13] ), for each positive integer n we may find a continuous (singe-valued) function γ n : K → E such that the graph of γ n is contained in the 1/n neighborhood of Gr(Γ). That is, for all x ∈ K, d((x, γ n (x)), Gr(Γ)) := inf {d ((x, γ n (x)), (y, z)) : y ∈ K, z ∈ Γ(y)} < 1/n, where d denotes some metric on K × E. Since K ∋ x → φ(x, γ n (x)) ∈ K is continuous, Schauder's fixed point theorem implies that there exists x n ∈ K such that x n = φ(x n , γ n (x n )). By Lemma 17.8 and Theorem 17.10 of [2] , Γ(K) := x∈K Γ(x) ⊂ X is compact and Gr(Γ) is closed. Thus Gr(Γ) ⊂ K × Γ(K) is compact. Since d((x n , γ n (x)), Gr(Γ)) → 0 and Gr(Γ) is compact, there exist a subsequence x n k and a point (x, y) ∈ Gr(Γ) such that (x n k , γ n k (x n k )) → (x, y). This completes the proof, since y ∈ Γ(x) and since continuity of φ yields
A special case of Berge's maximum theorem (17.31 of [2] ) will be useful: 
2. Proof of Theorem 3.5 (existence). We now turn toward the proof of Theorem 3.5. In what follows, we always use the topology τ ψ (C) on P ψ (C), except when stated otherwise. Despite its simplicity, we state the following result as a lemma for later references.
Lemma 7.6. Let (E, E) and (F, F ) be measurable spaces, and let µ, ν ∈ P(E) with ν ≪ µ. If X : E → F is measurable, then
Lemma 7.7. For any q ∈ R with |q| ≥ 1, we have (recall that X := P • X −1 )
, and thus, since q(q−1) ≥ 0,
Hence, Lemma 7.6 and Jensen's inequality yield
Since this bound is independent of (µ, α), we indeed have M q < ∞.
In terms of the notation from Lemma 7.7, let M := max(M 2 , M −1 ). Let
By construction, the range of Φ is contained in Q × M. Critical to our fixed point theorem is the following compactness result, which probably exists in various forms elsewhere in the literature. Part of the result may be found, for example, in Lemma 6.2.16 of [16] . But, for lack of a concise reference, and to keep the paper fairly self-contained, we include a complete proof of the following:
Proposition 7.8. The space (Q, τ ψ (C)) is convex, compact, and metrizable. Moreover, τ 1 (C) and τ ψ (C) induce the same topology on Q.
Proof. Of course, by τ 1 (C) we mean τ φ (C) with φ ≡ 1. Define
Cleary each set is convex. We will show that Q 1 is compact and metrizable under τ 1 (C), that Q 2 is τ 1 (C)-closed, and that τ 1 (C) and τ ψ (C) induce the same topology on Q 1 . Let q ∈ R with |q| ≥ 1. The set
s. along a subsequence, and thus Fatou's lemma yields |Z| q dX ≤ lim inf |Z n | q dX ≤ M . Hence, K q is weakly closed (see Theorem 5.98 of [2] ). For q > 1, the set K q is uniformly integrable and thus weakly compact, by the Dunford-Pettis theorem; moreover, K q is metrizable, since it is a weakly compact subset of separable Banach space (Theorem V.6.3 of [17] ). Now, for µ ≪ X , define F (µ) := dµ/dX . Then F is a homeomorphism from (Q 2 , τ 1 (C)) to K −1 equipped with the weak topology of L 1 (X ), and so Q 2 is τ 1 (C)-closed. Similarly, F is a homeomorphism from (Q 1 , τ 1 (C)) to K 2 with the weak topology, and so (Q 1 , τ 1 (C)) is compact and metrizable.
It remains to prove that τ 1 (C) and τ ψ (C) coincide on Q 1 . Let φ ∈ B ψ (C) with |φ| ≤ ψ, µ ∈ P ψ (C), and ǫ > 0, and define U = {ν ∈ P ψ (C) :
Since τ ψ (C) is stronger than τ 1 (C), it suffices to find a τ 1 (C)-neighborhood V of µ with V ∩ Q 1 ⊂ U ∩ Q 1 . First, note that for any c > 0 and ν ∈ Q 1 , the CauchySchwarz inequality yields
Since ψ 2 dX < ∞ by (S.2), we may find c > 0 such that {ψ≥c} ψ dν ≤ ǫ/3 for all ν ∈ Q 1 . Then, for any ν ∈ Q 1 ,
Since |φ| ≤ ψ, we have φ1 {ψ<c} ∈ B 1 (C), and thus V ∈ τ 1 (C).
The next two lemmas pertain to the Z µ,ν terms that arise in the BSDE representations above; in particular, a kind of continuity of the map (µ, ν) → Z µ,ν is needed.
Lemma 7.9. Suppose assumption (E) holds. Then for each
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × C, the function Q × P(A) × R d ∋ (µ, q, z) → H(t, x, µ, q,
z) is continuous, and the set-valued function
Proof. Since Q is metrizable by Lemma 7.8, this is simply a combination of assumption (E) with Theorem 7.5, using E = Q × P(A) × R d and K = A. Recall from (S.1) that A is compact.
It is clear now that I n → 0, because of assumption (E) and the dominated convergence theorem. Rewrite II n as
For fixed s and ω, the function
s ) is continuous, uniformly in q (see Lemma 5.6). Thus
By definition of the stable topology of M, we also have
It is now clear that II n → 0, and the proof is complete.
The last ingredient of the proof is to establish the applicability of Proposition 7.4. Note that A is a compact subset of a normed space, say (A ′ , · A ), and thus A may also be viewed as a subset of the normed space of (equivalence classes of dt × dP -a.e. equal) progressively measurable A ′ -valued processes, with the norm Proof. Convexity follows immediately from assumption (C). We first show A(·) has closed values. Let L denote Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Note that · A is bounded on A, and thus · A metrizes convergence in L × P -measure. To prove closedness, fix a sequence α n ∈ A(µ, ν) such that α n − α A → 0 for some α ∈ A. By passing to a subsequence, we may assume α
× Ω with L × P (N ) = 1. We may assume also that α n t (ω) ∈ A(t, X(ω), µ, Z µ,ν t (ω)) for all n and (t, ω) ∈ N . By Theorem 7.5, for each (t, ω) the set A(t, X(ω), µ, Z µ,ν t (ω)) ⊂ A is compact, and thus α t (ω) ∈ A(t, X(ω), µ, Z
To prove upper hemicontinuity, let (µ
it follows then from upper hemicontinuity of A(t, x, ·, ·) (Lemma 7.9) that c n → 0 in L × P -measure as well. Since of course c n is bounded, the proof will be complete once we establish
To prove that we can pass the infimum and supremum inside of the integrals, we first use Theorem 18.19 of [2] to draw a number of conclusions. First, the map (t, ω) → A t (ω) is measurable, in the sense of Definition 18.1 of [2] , and thus also weakly measurable since it is compact-valued (see Lemma 18.2 of [2] ). Second, there exists a measurable functionβ :
Note that for any α n ∈ A, the processβ(t, ω, α n t (ω)) is in A(µ, ν). Hence, we may exchange the infimum and the expectation to get
It follows from Theorem 7.5 that a → inf { a − b A : b ∈ A t (ω)} is continuous for each (t, ω). Hence, Theorem 18.19 of [2] also tells us that there exists a measurable selectionβ
, and so we exchange the supremum and the expectation to get Now let (µ n , α n ) → (µ, α) in (Q, τ ψ (C))×(A, · A ). We first show that P µ n ,α n → P µ,α . By Pinsker's inequality, it suffices to show
Since dP Since P µ,α ∼ P and α n → α in L × P -measure, it follows from Lemma 7.10 that Z µ n ,ν n → Z µ,ν in L × P µ,α -measure, where L denotes Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. By assumption (E), the map σ −1 b(t, x, ·, ·) is continuous for each (t, x). Conclude from the bounded convergence theorem that P µ n ,α n → P µ,α in total variation. It follows immediately that P µ n ,α n • X −1 → P µ,α • X −1 in total variation, and that
Moreover, P µ,α •(α
in L-measure, which finally implies
With continuity of Φ established, Φ and A(·) verify the assumptions of Proposition 7.4, and thus there exists a fixed point (µ, ν) ∈ Φ(µ, A(µ, ν)) = {Φ(µ, α) : α ∈ A(µ, ν)}. It remains to notice that the function Φ takes values in Q × M 0 , where M 0 := ν ∈ M : ν(dt, dq) = δq (t) (dq)dt for some measurableq : [0, T ] → P(A)} .
For an element in M 0 , the correponding mapq is uniquely determined, up to almost everywhere equality. Hence, for our fixed point (µ, ν), we know that there exist α ∈ A(µ, ν) and a measurable functionq : [0, T ] → P(A) such that ν t = δq (t) andq(t) = P µ,α • α −1 t for almost every t. . Recall that P µ,α agrees with P on F 0 for each µ ∈ P ψ (C) and α ∈ A. In particular, 
Proof of finite-player approximation theorems
This section justifies the mean field approximation by proving Theorem 4.2, the general approximation result, as well as Proposition 6.1, the rate of convergence for the price impact model. 8.1. Proof of Theorem 4.2. We work on the probability space of Section 4. Recall that under P , X 1 , X 2 , . . . are i.i.d. with common lawμ and α 1 t , α 2 t , . . . are i.i.d. with common lawq t , for almost every t. By symmetry, we may prove the result for player 1 only. For β ∈ A n , define β α := (β, α 2 , . . . , α n ) ∈ A n n . We abuse notation somewhat by writing α in place of (α 1 , . . . , α n ) ∈ A n n . Note that (α 1 ) α = α and P n (α) = P , in our notation. For β ∈ A n , let
f (t, X 1 ,μ,q t , β t )dt + g(X 1 ,μ) .
Note that J ′ n (α 1 ) does not depend on n. We divide the proof into three lemmas. 
and we conclude by the dominated convergence theorem. Proof. Note that, for any β ∈ A n , Theorem 18.19 of [2] ensures that both functions are (empirically) measurable. Since A and P(A) are compact, Lemma 5.6 assures us that F t (x, ·) is τ ψ (C)-continuous atμ and that G t (x, ·) is weakly continuous, for each (t, x). Similar to the proof of Lemma 7.7, {dP n (β α )/dP : β ∈ A n , n ≥ 1} are bounded in L p (P ), for any p ≥ 1. Since assumption (F.5) is uniform in t for f , we deduce from 
